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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
DEBEVOISE, Senior District Judge: 
 
Appellant, McDougal-Saddler, appeals the district court's 
order granting the motion of Cynthia Metzler, Acting 
Secretary, United States Department of Labor ("DOL")1 to 
dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
In an earlier opinion we affirmed the district court on the 
ground that McDougal-Saddler lacked standing to bring 
this action. Upon her petition for panel rehearing we 
vacated that opinion and asked for supplemental briefing. 
We will now affirm, holding that by virtue of 5 U.S.C. 
S 8128(b) the district court did not have jurisdiction. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Alexis M. Herman is presently United States Secretary of Labor. 
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I. The Facts 
 
On May 14, 1982 McDougal-Saddler, then a 39-year old 
U.S. Postal Service distribution clerk, filed a claim with the 
Office of Workers' Compensation Program ("OWCP") for an 
injury to her back, upper neck and shoulder sustained on 
May 8 when handling trays of mail. On June 24 the OWCP 
began payment of compensation for temporary total 
disability. Dr. David S. Schwartz, a Board-certified internist 
and cardiologist, began treating McDougal-Saddler on 
August and diagnosed cervical and lumbosacral strains. He 
found his patient to be totally disabled. 
 
After a February 1985 fitness-for-duty evaluation, 
McDougal-Saddler was offered and accepted reemployment 
as a distribution clerk with limited duties. She returned to 
work on March 31, 1985 but again stopped working on 
April 5, stating that because of pain in her neck, shoulder, 
arm and back she could not continue. Dr. Schwartz 
examined her the next day; he diagnosed cervical and 
lumbar strain and stated she was totally disabled. 
 
On May 7, McDougal-Saddler filed a claim for a 
traumatic injury to her neck, shoulders and upper and 
lower back sustained on April 5 when casing mail. On May 
20 the OWCP again began payment of compensation for 
temporary total disability. In a June 17, 1985 report Dr. 
Schwartz diagnosed cervical radiculopathy. In a May 22, 
1986 report he diagnosed chronic pain syndrome including 
chronic lumbosacral strain and chronic cervical strain. In 
an April 10, 1987 report Dr. Schwartz wrote, "Because of 
chronic debilitating pain and limited range of motion due to 
muscle stiffness and spasm, despite intensive physical 
therapy and medication, [McDougal-Saddler] is totally 
disabled from work at this time and for the near indefinite 
future." 
 
The OWCP referred McDougal-Saddler to Dr. William H. 
Simon, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon for a second 
opinion. In a May 4, 1987 report Dr. Simon diagnosed 
cervical and lumbar discogenic syndrome with cervical and 
lumbar nerve root irritation. He concluded that "[t]here is 
no evidence that she sustained any acute injury that is 
responsible for this but that she has a slowly developing 
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degenerative condition which limits the amount of work 
that she can do." 
 
On December 31, 1987 the OWCP notified McDougal- 
Saddler that it proposed to terminate her compensation on 
the ground that her disability resulting from her 
employment injuries had ceased. In response McDougal- 
Saddler submitted another report of Dr. Schwartz in which 
he stated that her symptoms were "specifically due" to her 
May 8, 1982 injury and that her April 5, 1985 injury 
"added to her previous cervical and lumbosacral strain." 
 
Effective November 20, 1988 the OWCP terminated 
McDougal-Saddler's compensation on the ground that the 
weight of the medical evidence established that her 
disability from her employment injuries ceased by that 
date. After a hearing an OWCP hearing representative 
found in a February 21, 1989 decision that McDougal- 
Saddler had not been afforded due process because she 
had not been provided with a copy of Dr. Simon's May 4, 
1987 report. The hearing representative remanded the case 
for reinstatement of compensation and a re-evaluation by 
Dr. Simon. 
 
At Dr. Simon's request a Board-certified radiologist 
performed a computerized tomography scan of McDougal- 
Saddler's lumbosacral and cervical spine. On the basis of 
the resulting report Dr. Simon revised his original opinion, 
stating in a November 15, 1989 report, "we now have 
objective evidence that this patient has cervical discogenic 
abnormalities beyond degenerative changes both in her 
neck and back." 
 
Based on the entirety of the reports which had been 
submitted to it, the OWCP found that there was a conflict 
of medical opinion. On October 22, 1991, it referred the 
case to Dr. John T. Williams, a Board-certified orthopedic 
surgeon, to resolve the conflict. The OWCP purported to act 
pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. S 8123(a), which 
provides: "If there is disagreement between the physician 
making the examination for the United States [Dr. Simon] 
and the physician of the employee [Dr. Schwartz], the 
Secretary shall appoint a third physician who shall make 
an examination." According to the Federal (FECA) 
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Procedure Manual, "The [Employees' Compensation Appeals 
Board] has stated that `an impartial specialist's report is 
entitled to greater weight than other evidence of record as 
long as his conclusion is not vague, speculative or 
equivocal and is supported by substantial medical 
reasoning'." Part Two, Chapter 2-810.11 c.(2). 
 
Dr. Williams conducted a physical examination of 
McDougal-Saddler, reviewed the medical records and in a 
March 4, 1992 report stated, among other things, that 
"what we are seeing here is the progression of degenerative 
joint and degenerative disc disease over a period of 
approximately seven years secondary to the normal wear 
and tear on the body and the aging process. The work- 
related injury did not cause the degenerative pathology first 
noted in 1987." 
 
The OWCP terminated McDougal-Saddler's compensation 
on September 20, 1992, concluding that the weight of the 
medical evidence, represented by Dr. Williams's reports, 
established that the effects of her April 5, 1985 and May 
11, 1982 injuries had ceased. On appeal an OWCP hearing 
representative found in a November 24, 1993 decision that 
the opinion of Dr. Williams, the impartial medical specialist, 
resolved the conflict of medical opinion and established that 
the effects of the 1982 and 1985 injuries had ceased by 
September 20, 1992. By letter dated February 27, 1995 
McDougal-Saddler requested reconsideration, contending, 
among other things, that Dr. Williams was not an impartial 
medical specialist entitled to special weight because Dr. 
Simon's November 15, 1989 report did not conflict with the 
conclusions of Dr. Schwartz. The OWCP denied the request 
for reconsideration, and McDougal-Saddler appealed to the 
Employees' Compensation Appeals Board ("ECAB"). 
 
The ECAB authored a detailed opinion. It weighed the 
evidence which had been developed during the years 
following McDougal-Saddler's original injury in May 1982. 
It contrasted the qualifications of Drs. Williams and 
Schwartz and analyzed the basis and reasoning of their 
respective reports. It found "that the weight of the medical 
evidence establishes that [McDougal-Saddler's] disability 
related to her May 8, 1982 and April 5, 1985 employment 
injuries ended by September 20, 1992." 
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The ECAB, however, agreed with McDougal-Saddler's 
contention that Dr. Williams was not an impartial medical 
specialist because at the time of his appointment there was 
no conflict of medical opinion. 
 
The consequence which the ECAB attributed to the 
denial of impartial medical specialist status to Dr. Williams 
was ". . . the reports of Dr. Williams are thus not entitled 
to the special weight afforded to the opinion of an impartial 
medical specialist resolving a conflict of medical opinion 
. . ." The ECAB treated Dr. Williams's reports in the same 
manner as it treated the other medical evidence, giving it 
no special deference. It weighed the totality of the evidence 
and on March 20, 1996 affirmed the decision of the OWCP. 
Thereafter it denied a petition for reconsideration. 
 
McDougal-Saddler contends that the procedures leading 
to the denial of her benefits were in violation of the clear 
mandate of 5 U.S.C. S 8123(a) which provides in relevant 
part: 
 
       If there is disagreement between the physician making 
       the examination for the United States and the 
       physician of the employee, the Secretary shall appoint 
       a third physician who shall make an examination. 
       (emphasis added). 
 
This mandate is implemented by regulation: 
 
       If there should be disagreement between the physician 
       making the examination on the part of the United 
       States and the injured employee's physician, the Office 
       shall appoint a third physician, qualified in the 
       appropriate specialty, who shall make an 
       examination . . . . (emphasis added). 
 
20 C.F.R. S 10.408. 
 
The ECAB's opinion held that Dr. Williams was not an 
impartial expert because there was no conflict of medical 
opinion at the time his opinion was sought. Thus the 
"disagreement between the physician making the 
examination for the United States and the physician of the 
employee" arose at the time Dr. Williams rendered his 
opinion. Notwithstanding the dictate of S 8123(a), the ECAB 
did not require appointment of "a third physician". Instead 
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it weighed the evidence before it, affirmed the decision of 
the OWCP terminating compensation and later denied a 
petition for reconsideration. 
 
Notwithstanding the explicit language of S 8123(a) and 
implementing regulations, OWCP weighs the medical 
reports when determining whether to appoint a third 
physician. In its Federal (FECA) Procedural Manual and in 
practice, according to McDougal-Saddler, OWCP appoints a 
third physician only "where the analysis of the evidence 
demonstrates conflicting opinions or conclusions which are 
supported almost equally." Generally "[c]areful analysis of 
the medical evidence should allow for resolution of most 
issues without resorting to a referee or `impartial' 
specialist." (Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part Two, 
Chapter 2-810-11 a, App. 53). 
 
It is difficult to square this weighing process with the 
S 8123(a) mandate that "[i]f there is disagreement [between 
the government and employee physicians] the Secretary 
shall appoint a third physician." (emphasis added). 
 
McDougal-Saddler filed in the district court a complaint 
and petition for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging 
that DOL has adopted procedures that violate the statutory 
directive regarding the appointment of a third physician. 
 
II. The District Court Opinion 
 
The DOL moved to dismiss McDougal-Saddler's complaint 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on 5 U.S.C. 
S 8128(b) which provides: 
 
       (b) The action of the Secretary or his designee in 
       allowing or denying a payment under this subchapter 
       is-- 
 
       (1) final and conclusive for all purposes and with 
       respect to all questions of law and fact; and 
 
       (2) not subject to review by another official of the 
       United States or by a court by mandamus or 
       otherwise. 
 
McDougal-Saddler urged in opposition to the motion to 
dismiss that two exceptions to the prohibition on judicial 
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review applied. She asserted that the bar did not apply 
because she presented evidence of a cognizable 
constitutional violation. She asserted further that the bar 
did not apply because the actions of the DOL violated a 
clear statutory mandate. 
 
The district court rejected McDougal-Saddler's 
constitutional claims. It held that FECA PM 2-810-11a 
providing for a weighing of the medical evidence before 
appointing a third physician was simply an interpretive rule 
clarifying the word "disagreement" in S 8123(a) and 
therefore did not require public notice or a public comment 
period to be valid. Its application to McDougal-Saddler did 
not violate her due process rights or otherwise create a 
cognizable constitutional claim. McDougal-Saddler does not 
challenge this ruling in her appeal. 
 
The district court assumed for the purposes of its 
decision that a violation of a clear statutory mandate 
creates subject matter jurisdiction for a court to hear a 
case brought under FECA. It found, however, that because 
the ECAB interpretation was plausible, there was no such 
violation, holding: 
 
       The Court concludes that FECA PM 2-810 instructs 
       claims examiners in how to determine whether a 
       "disagreement" between physicians exists, and that 
       defendant's interpretation of 5 U.S.C. S 8123(a), using 
       FECA PM 2-810, is plausible. Under that 
       interpretation, it was appropriate for ECAB to decide 
       plaintiff's claim based on the weight of the medical 
       evidence. ECAB did not violate a clear statutory 
       mandate in evaluating plaintiff 's claim. The statute did 
       not, under the facts presented, require ECAB to 
       remand the case for the appointment of an 
       independent physician to conduct an examination of 
       plaintiff. 
 
The court granted DOL's motion to dismiss. 
 
III. Discussion 
 
The statutory provision at issue here provides that "[t]he 
action of the Secretary or his designee in allowing or 
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denying a payment is - (1) final and conclusive for all 
purposes with respect to all questions of law and fact; and 
(2) not subject to review by another official of the United 
States or by a Court by mandamus or otherwise." 5 U.S.C. 
S 8128(b). Although Congress is ordinarily presumed to 
have intended judicial review of agency action, "Congress is 
absolutely free to limit the extent to which it consents to 
suit" against the United States or its instrumentalities. 
Clinton County Com'rs v. United States E.P.A., 116 F.3d 
1018, 1025 (3d Cir. 1997) cert. denied sub nom. Arrest the 
Incinerator Remediation (A.I.R.), Inc., 118 S.Ct. 687. 139 
L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). 
 
The starting point for the determination of Congress's 
intent is the language of the statute. See New Rock Asset 
Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 
F.3d 1492, 1498 (3d Cir. 1996). In the present case there 
can hardly be plainer language than that which S 8128(b) 
employs. The Supreme Court has referred to S 8128(b) as 
an example of language that Congress uses when it 
"intends to bar judicial review altogether." Lindahl v. Office 
of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 779-780, 105 
S.Ct. 1620, 84 L.Ed.2d 674 (1985). 
 
The question whether a statute precludes judicial review 
"is determined not only from its express language, but also 
from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, 
its legislative history, and the nature of the administrative 
action involved." Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 
U.S. 340, 345, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984). 
Both McDougal-Saddler and the DOL have reviewed the 
legislative history of FECA and in particular the evolution of 
S 8128(b). Each side argues that the legislative history 
supports its position. 
 
In Czerkies v. United States Dep't of Labor, 73 F.3d 1435 
(7th Cir. 1996), Chief Judge Posner examined the same 
history and found that it "reveals the limited scope of the 
door-closing provision." Id. at 1440, and that adoption of 
the provision "may well have been an accident." Id. at 1441. 
That case, however, concerned a constitutional challenge to 
action of the DOL. The court held that "[t]he history of the 
Federal Employees Compensation Act provides no basis for 
rebutting the presumption of judicial review of 
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constitutional claims. It is distasteful to suppose that an 
administrative agency would claim to receive from Congress 
by sheer inadvertence a license to ignore the Constitution." 
Id. at 1441. Although the district court had jurisdiction to 
hear Czerkies' constitutional claim, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the judgment dismissing the suit because the 
constitutional claim was insubstantial. 
 
Unlike Czerkies the present appeal does not involve a 
constitutional claim. The district court held that adoption 
and compliance with the provisions in the procedural 
Manual providing for a weighing of the medical evidence did 
not violate McDougal-Saddler's due process rights or 
otherwise create a cognizable constitutional claim. 
McDougal-Saddler does not challenge that conclusion on 
this appeal, and we are not required to decide whether 
S 8128(b) would deprive a district court of jurisdiction to 
hear such a claim. 
 
It is necessary to decide whether an asserted violation of 
a clear statutory mandate constitutes a second exception to 
the statutory bar. We conclude that there is nothing in the 
legislative history which would permit a departure from the 
unequivocal language of S 8123(b) to review such an 
asserted violation, and that the decisions of our court 
preclude such a departure. 
 
McDougal-Saddler relies primarily upon two United 
States Supreme Court cases, Oestereich v. Selective Serv. 
Sys., 393 U.S. 233, 89 S.Ct. 414, 21 L.Ed.2d 402 (1968) 
and Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 180, 3 L.Ed.2d 
210 (1958). In Oestereich the draft law gave a "plain and 
unequivocal" service exemption to students preparing for 
the ministry. Notwithstanding the exemption, Oestereich's 
draft board reclassified him I-A as a form of discipline when 
he returned his registration certificate to protest the 
Vietnam War. Oestereich brought suit in the United States 
District Court to restrain his induction. Unambiguously 
S 10(b)(3) of the Military Service Act of 1967 provided that 
"No judicial review shall be made of the classification or 
processing of any registrant by local boards, appeal boards, 
or the President, except as a defense to a criminal 
prosecution instituted under section 12 of this title, after 
the registrant has responded either affirmatively or 
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negatively to an order to report for induction . . .." The 
Court declined to apply S 10(b)(3) literally, holding that 
"[s]ince the exemption granted divinity students is plain 
and unequivocal . . . pre-induction judicial review is not 
precluded . . . ." 393 U.S. at 238-239. 
 
In Leedom the National Labor Relations Board included 
both professional and nonprofessional employees in a 
collective bargaining unit in clear violation of the National 
Labor Relations Act. The association representing the 
professional employees brought suit in the United States 
District Court challenging the NLRB's action. The NLRA 
permitted judicial review of a Board certification order by a 
petition for enforcement or review of an order made under 
S 10(c) of the Act restraining an unfair labor practice; the 
Board argued that its order was not otherwise subject to 
judicial review. The Court held that the review provisions of 
the NLRA did not preclude an action "to strike down an 
order of the Board made in excess of its delegated powers 
and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act." 358 U.S. 
at 188. 
 
More recent decisions of the Supreme Court and of our 
Court establish that Oestereich has not been extended 
beyond its particular facts and that the Kyne "clear 
statutory mandate" exception will not be applied when the 
statute provides clear and convincing evidence that 
Congress intended to deny district court jurisdiction. In 
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 
502 U.S. 32, 112 S.Ct. 459, 116 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991), 
MCorp sought to enjoin administrative proceedings 
instituted against it by the Federal Reserve Board on the 
ground that the proceedings were in excess of the Board's 
authority. It relied upon the Kyne doctrine to overcome the 
statutory bar to district court jurisdiction. The Court 
advanced two reasons for applying the statutory bar 
notwithstanding a claim of violation of a clear statutory 
mandate. First, MCorp had an alternative means of review. 
Second: 
 
       . . . [a] related factor distinguishing this litigation from 
       Kyne is the clarity of the congressional preclusion of 
       review in FISA. In Kyne, the NLRB contended that a 
       statutory provision that provided for judicial review 
 
                                11 
  
       implied, by its silence, a preclusion of review of the 
       contested determination. By contrast, in FISA Congress 
       has spoken clearly and directly: "[N]o court shall have 
       jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the 
       issuance or enforcement of any [Board] notice or order 
       under this section." 12 USC S 1818(i)(1) (1988 ed, Supp 
       II) [12 USCS S 1818(i)(1)] (emphasis added). In this way 
       as well, this litigation differs from Kyne. 
 
        Viewed in this way, Kyne stands for the familiar 
       proposition that "only upon a showing of `clear and 
       convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent 
       should the courts restrict access to judicial review." 
       Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 US 136, 141, 18 L 
       Ed 2d 681, 87 S Ct 1507 (1967). As we have explained, 
       however, in this case the statute provides us with clear 
       and convincing evidence that Congress intended to 
       deny the District Court jurisdiction to review and 
       enjoin the Board's ongoing administrative proceedings. 
 
502 U.S. at 44 (footnote omitted). 
 
In Hindes v. F.D.I.C., 137 F.3d 148, 164 (3d Cir. 1998), 
we noted the "limited exception to a statute's withdrawal of 
jurisdiction where the plaintiff claims that the agency acted 
in a blatantly lawless manner or contrary to a clear 
statutory prohibition" and emphasized "that an integral 
factor in determining the applicability of the exception is 
the clarity of the statutory preclusion." 
 
In Clinton County plaintiffs sued the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to enjoin EPA 
from proceeding with a trial burn and incineration remedy. 
The district Court dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, citing statutory provisions precluding judicial 
review until EPA's remedial activities were completed. 
Rejecting plaintiffs' contention that under the Kyne doctrine 
violation of a clear statutory prohibition constituted an 
exception to the statutory bar, we stated "[s]ubsequent 
cases have refined the Kyne doctrine. In Briscoe v. Bell, 432 
U.S. 404, 97 S.Ct. 2428, 53 L.Ed.2d 439 (1977), the Court 
held that jurisdiction to review agency action allegedly in 
excess of statutory authority cannot be inferred when 
language in the statute itself expressly forecloses judicial 
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review . . . . More recently, in Board of Governors v. MCorp 
Financial, Inc., . . . the [Supreme] Court reiterated that a 
right to judicial review under Kyne may be inferred only if 
there is no clear statutory prohibition of such review." 116 
F.3d at 1028-1029.2 
 
The language of S 8128(b) provides clear and convincing 
evidence that Congress intended to deny the district courts 
jurisdiction to review decisions of the DOL. The language is 
broad enough to include both policy or rule making 
decisions of the Secretary as well as individual benefit 
determinations. Paluca v. Secretary of Labor, 813 F.2d 524, 
527-28 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Roberts v. Secretary 
of Labor, 484 U.S. 943, 108 S.Ct. 328, 98 L.Ed.2d 355 
(1987). 
 
McDougal-Saddler seeks to distinguish MCorp, Hindes 
and Clinton County from the present case, arguing that (i) 
MCorp, the CERCLA case (Clinton County) and the FIRREA 
case (Hindes) each involves claims with language, history 
and function very different from those applicable in FECA 
cases and (ii) in MCorp, Hindes and Clinton County some 
form of relief was available in future proceedings. The 
principles of statutory construction set forth in those cases, 
however, are equally applicable here, regardless of the 
context. When a plaintiff seeks to rely upon the Kyne 
doctrine these circumstances are insufficient to overcome a 
clear statutory prohibition of judicial review such as 
S 8128(b). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In dicta four circuits have stated S 1331 jurisdiction exists to review 
claims that OWCP policy violated clear statutory commands. See Staacke 
v. United States Secretary of Labor, 841 F.2d 278, 281-82 (9th Cir. 
1988), citing Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. , 393 U.S. 233, 89 S.Ct. 
414, 21 L.Ed.2d 402 (1968) and Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 
180, 3 L.Ed.2d 210 (1958) (finding no clear statutory command); 
Woodruff v. United States Dep't of Labor, 954 F.2d 634, 639-40 (11th Cir. 
1992); (same); Brumley v. United States Dep't of Labor, 28 F.3d 746 (8th 
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1082, 115 S.Ct. 734, 130 L.Ed.2d 637 
(1995) (same); Hanauer v. Reich, 82 F.3d 1304, 1307-09 (4th Cir. 1996). 
These opinions, however, predate our Court's opinions in Hindes and 
Clinton County. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's order granting the DOL's motion to dismiss the 
complaint. 
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